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28 September 1979

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 25/79)



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SOVIET COMMENTS ON NATO 'AUTUMN FORGE-78'

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE CBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 10-14

[Article by Lt Col M. Vasil'chenko: "NATO Maneuvers 'Autumn Forge-78'"]

[Text] True to the obligations assumed in the Helsinki accords, which are fixed in the Final Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, countries of the socialist community are striving steadfastly to improve relationships with all West European states. Steps they are taking in this direction are leading to a significant alleviation of the political climate in Europe and are a reliable guarantee of international security on the continent. But peaceloving efforts of the socialist countries are encountering continuous resistance on the part of enemies of detente, among whom the NATO militarists are in the vanguard as before.

Having lost all sense of reality, the politicians and strategists of the North Atlantic Alliance continue to intimidate their nations with falsehoods about the "growing Soviet threat" and stubbornly declaim for an expansion in the program of military preparations within bloc countries. A further improvement in operational and combat training of NATO staffs and troops (fleets) and their preparation for conducting combat operations against Warsaw Pact countries is one of the most important ways for implementing the militarists' aggressive schemes.

The command elements and staffs of this bloc play a leading role in the planning and conduct of personnel training and ideological conditioning. At the present time they are attempting to assume full control over the combat training of member country troops. This is manifested specifically in the unification of a number of national and NATO exercises by means of a single plan and operational-strategic background, as well as in common direction of the exercises.

As the foreign press has emphasized, the views of the NATO command element on waging war are tested most fully during the "Autumn Forge" fall maneuvers, which have been held annually beginning in 1975. They are typified by the integrated accomplishment of missions, broad scope and scale, and

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inclusion of troops, staffs, establishments and all branches of armed forces of varying nationality.

Foreign specialists believe that an opportunity is created for working out problems of strategic importance in accomplishing special tactical missions against the background of "Autumn Forge" exercises held in various regions (from the North Atlantic to Turkey) with a certain time separation (two or three months) and playing out one of the variants of the initiation and conduct of combat operations in Europe and on the Atlantic as a whole.

The "Autumn Forge-78" fall maneuvers (August-November) included around 50 joint and national exercises. The most important and largest in scale were "Northern Wedding-78" in the East Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, North Sea and the area of the English Channel, "Bar Frost-78" (northern Norway), "Black Bear" (southern Norway), "Bold Guard-78" (Baltic Straits area) in the North European Theater of Military Operations; "Reforger" 10, "Certain Shield" corps exercises of the U.S. Army V Corps, "Cardinal Sword" (command and staff exercise) of U.S. Army VII Corps, "Red Dragoon" of UK Army I Corps, "Blaue Donau" of FRG Army II Corps, "Saxon Drive" of the Netherlands Army I Corps, "Red Tornado" of Belgian Army I Corps and the "Cold Fire-78" exercise of the joint air forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations; and "Display Determination" in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations.

According to western press data, over 320,000 persons were brought in for these fall maneuvers and over 14,000 tanks and APC's, around 2,700 warplanes and up to 300 various ships were used.

The political goals set for the participants in the maneuvers bore a clearly provocative character and a carefully prepared demonstration of power and "unity" of participating countries. The U.S. military-political leadership attempted to prove its resolve to NATO allies to reinforce bloc troop groupings in various parts of Europe. U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown thus declared that if necessary the Americans could move three divisions of ground troops, 1,200 warplanes, "dual-based" combined units (the 1st and 4th mechanized divisions, with personnel located on the North American Continent and combat equipment at depots in the FRG), as well as five divisions of the strategic reserve to Europe in a 30-day period.

As the foreign press reported, the NATO military-political leadership assigned the mission of practicing the following matters during the maneuvers: conversion of armed forces from a peacetime to a war footing; deployment and reinforcement of troop groupings and fleets in European and Atlantic theaters of military operations; conduct of combat actions in the first operations of a limited war with use of conventional means of destruction and tactical nuclear weapons; organization of coordination among branches of the armed forces and troops of different nationalities; improvement of control and communications systems; and logistical and medical support.

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An important place was given to checking the realistic nature of plans for conducting operations in Europe and on the Atlantic, as well as the readiness of staffs and troops to perform the missions assigned them.

Exercise "Northern Wedding-78" (4-19 September) was the largest in the history of existence of the NATO joint naval forces. Command elements and staffs of joint and national navies, NATO's attack fleet in the Atlantic, and the bloc's permanent combined naval units in the Atlantic and in the English Channel area (navies of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and France) were brought in to participate in the exercise. A total of 40,000 personnel, up to 220 warships and auxiliary vessels, 22 submarines, and around 800 aircraft and helicopters took part.

The following missions were worked during the exercise: combating "enemy" surface and submarine forces; conducting amphibious warfare operations in northern Norway (a landing on the Shetland Islands was played out), on the Jutland Peninsula (in the vicinity of Esbjerg, Denmark) and on the coast of southern Norway (city of Kristiansand); defense of ocean and sea lines of communication; providing direct air support to ground forces operating on maritime axes; defense against landing forces; convoy escort; defense of ship forces and convoys on the sea transit; reconnaissance and MTO [defense against underwater ordnance].

The amphibious operation on the Shetlands occupied an important place in the exercise. Around 8,000 marines of navies of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were landed by a combined method (water craft, landing craft and helicopters) in its course. Operations by the amphibious force were supported by carrier-based and tactical aircraft as well as ships' guns.

Air defense of the attack carrier groups and detachments of amphibious warfare ships was accomplished by escort forces in close coordination with capabilities of the joint system of NATO air defense in Europe.

Special attention was given during the "Autumn Forge-78" maneuvers to a study of different variants for reinforcing NATO attack groupings in the European theaters of military operations. This mission was accomplished by shifting American and British units and subunits of ground forces, air forces and marines to Central Europe and to the bloc's flanks, and by carrying out mobilization activities in European countries belonging to NATO.

According to data of the American newspaper ARMY TIMES, military transport aircraft and transport vessels of the United States delivered around 13,000 American service personnel, and combat equipment and military cargoes with an overall weight of 37,000 tons to the European Continent in "Reforger" 10, an integrated exercise of the American Armed Forces (August-November). The mission of delivering personnel directly to the zone of combat operations was worked in this phase.

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Combat operations were played out within the framework of this militaristic show of force by combined units and units of the American Army V Corps stationed in the FRG, by subunits moved from the United States, and by ground units of some western European countries of the bloc during the "Certain Shield" opposed forces troop exercise. It included the deployment of troop groupings, conduct of offensive, delaying, and defensive actions, tactical airborne landings, combat employment of fire support helicopters equipped with ATGM's, and the accomplishment of command and control, coordination and communications missions.

Headquarters of the U.S. Army VII Corps and its organic divisions conducted the "Cardinal Sword" command and staff exercise. Special attention was given to redeployment of troops, movement of reserves up from the depths, organization of strong counterblows with a subsequent assumption of the offensive, and the interworking of ground forces and tactical aviation.

Exercise "Reforger" 10 is covered in more detail in the "Ground Forces" section of this same issue of the journal.

According to foreign press reports, major troop exercises within the framework of "Autumn Forge" also were held with other army corps (the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium and the FRG) stationed in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. Two or three days usually were planned for accomplishing tactical defensive missions, and the remaining time was used to play out offensive actions, the forward movement and redeployment of troops, tactical airborne landings and so on. Problems of moving reserves and assaulting water obstacles occupied a prominent place.

As reported in the foreign press, Exercise "Display Determination-78" was conducted 15 September-13 October in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations. Command elements and staffs of national and joint armed forces in the theater, mobile bloc forces, and naval attack forces of NATO in the Mediterranean were brought in to participate. Missions accomplished during the exercise included the conversion of armed forces from a peacetime to a war footing, the organization and conduct of combat actions in initial operations without the use of nuclear weapons, winning sea supremacy and air superiority, interworking of combined units and units of different nationalities and so on.

Movement of U.S. tactical aircraft to Europe was accomplished within the framework of the American Air Force Exercise "Crested Cap" and that of the Marines within the framework of the exercise by NATO's joint navies, "Northern Wedding-78." The foreign military press emphasizes the considerable increase in the role of the American Marines in beefing up attack groupings in Europe. While they were moved chiefly to Northern Norway in the past, marine units and subunits took part in NATO exercises in Southern Norway and the Baltic Straits area in the present fall maneuvers.

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A great deal of attention was given, as before, to checking the mobilization readiness of the bloc countries' armed forces. Large reserve contingents were brought in for the primary exercises. According to the French newspaper FIGARO, Exercise "Blaue Donau" by the FRG Army II Corps practiced mobilization deployment of new Bundeswehr units. Twenty-four hours were given for notification, assembly and complete equipping of the reservists.

In conducting the "Autumn Forge-78" maneuvers, the NATO command pursued the goal of giving staffs and troops practice in planning and conducting combat actions during initial operations of a modern war. Vast regions of NATO's Western European countries actually were converted into military ranges from the latter half of September of last year. On the territory of the FRG alone eight major exercises were held almost simultaneously (see sketch) [Sketch not reproduced. Caption: Locations of primary exercises of NATO member countries on FRG territory in September-October 1978.], in which all combined units of the Northern and Central army groups and command elements of NATO ground forces in Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland and on Fuenen Island took part. Troops trained in conducting active offensive actions characterized by great scope and swift tempos.

As western military observers noted, American strategic aircraft took part in this type of exercise for the first time. B-52 bombers from SAC flew combat sorties from the continental United States.

The series of fall exercises concluded with a final command and staff exercise by the NATO joint armed forces (November), which examined problems of employing tactical nuclear weapons in a strategic operation in the European Theater of War.

As the experience of "Autumn Forge" type maneuvers shows, the NATO command is stepping up the intensity of operational and combat training of bloc armed forces from year to year and is improving its forms. The scope and character of actions being practiced attest to a build-up of military efforts by imperialist circles and about their aggressive intentions.

The activation of NATO's militaristic demonstrations obligates Soviet military personnel to maintain high vigilance constantly and always be ready to come to the defense of the homeland and the achievements of socialism in close cooperation with military personnel of fraternal socialist countries.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON CONTROL OF COALITION FORCES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 15--18

[Article by Col I. Andreyev based on views of the NATO command: "Selected Problems of Command and Control of Coalition Forces"]

[Text] In preparing for a new war, the military-political leadership of the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance is paying constant attention to improving command and control. It views this as one of the most important conditions for achieving success in conducting combat operations. It is believed that the control system has to provide for rapid consultations of the NATO command element and governments of bloc member countries for making coordinated decisions on primary issues when there is an aggravation of the international situation and the appearance of extraordinary circumstances; an organized conversion of armed forces and the countries' economies from a peacetime to a war footing; efficiency, flexibility, centralization and secrecy in command and control of combined units and units; preservation of deep secrecy around plans for war preparations; the continuous and effective coordination of joint and national command elements of branches of armed forces and combat arms; continuous collection of data on the enemy, and so on.

Control points of NATO command elements set up in peacetime play an important role in accomplishing the above missions. These are stationary (protected underground points) and mobile (accommodated aboard special aircraft, helicopters, motor vehicles and trains). They are outfitted with contemporary communications, situation display facilities and data transmission equipment.

The following measures are to be conducted for the purpose of a further development of the control system of coalition armed forces at the bloc level: improvement of the structure of supreme military entities and staffs; an improvement in the planning of combat operations; standardization of ordnance, combat equipment and the basic operational documents (introduction of common formatted combat documents—orders, instructions, reports—in the troops); an increase in the level of language training (primarily the study of English by NATO country officers); regular exercises and practices by troops of varying nationality conducted under a uniform methodology, and so

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There is a reorganization of NATO's supreme entities being conducted along the line of setting up component elements (directorates and sections) on staffs which would be capable of planning combat operations of the coalition armed forces with use both of nuclear and conventional weapons. Particular attention here is being given to a rational manning of staffs by specially trained officers from various bloc countries so that, as the bloc command element deliberately emphasizes, each country "can take a direct part in developing decisions on primary military issues" (see table) [table not reproduced].

Officer training for major staffs of the joint armed forces is conducted at the NATO War College in Rome and in a special school (the town of Oberammergau in the FRG). Instruction there is conducted in English. This makes it considerably simpler to overcome the difficulties caused by the language barrier in elaborating plans and making decisions in the highest echelon of military control.

In the estimate of foreign specialists, this structure of the joint staffs and their manning helps on the whole in resolving problems of controlling coalition forces, primarily at the highest level.

The foreign press has emphasized that the problem of interworking of joint and national commands and attaining the maximum possible compatibility of control systems generates greatest concern among bloc leaders. These difficulties are being overcome in part by determining ahead of time the categories of combined units and units to be transferred to operational control of the NATO command, the procedure and time periods of their resubordination, and allocation of spheres of responsibility among joint and national control entities.

It is generally known that the bloc joint armed forces include personnel and weapons of the joint system of NATO air defense in Europe, mobile forces, and permanent naval forces in the Atlantic and the English Channel area in peacetime. With the announcement of a simple alert all combat units primarily intended for inclusion in bloc joint forces are transferred to them. But the national commands carry out logistical support of the transferred troops. In addition, these commands bear responsibility for the communications zone.

A majority of the national contingents (from army corps on down) are subordinate to the national command element. Resubordination of units and subunits to the command element of a different nation occurs only in exceptional instances if the situation requires it.

The assignment of special liaison groups from all national command elements (chiefly from army corps) to superior joint commands is envisaged for successful command and control in the multinational structure of NATO. For example, there is a group of liaison officers made up of 11 persons (three from the FRG, one each from Belgium and the Netherlands and six from other

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states) on the staff of the Northern Army Group. Each officer is obligated to know English, the weapons and combat equipment of all bloc member counties, as well as the organizational structure of troops and all documents on coordination effective in NATO.

One of the primary objectives of joint exercises and practices is to work out coordination primarily at the tactical level, where differences in the level of combat readiness of units and subunits, in language and so on have the most telling effect. Provisions are being made above all to secure the boundaries between combined units of different nations which, in the estimate of foreign specialists, are especially vulnerable. Operations by units and subunits in these sectors require detailed coordination. To this end NATO has elaborated special statutes regulating troop missions on flanks (boundaries), deadlines for restoration of forces for covering the flanks, and organization of coordination. They have to guarantee mutual support and the delivery of coordinated attacks, including air strikes.

The foreign press emphasizes that special importance is assumed by identification both of allied and enemy troops during the conduct of combat operations as part of coalition formations. For this reason NATO has set up special instructions in peacetime for mutual recognition of units and subunits, which are used in joint exercises. The instructions cover the transmission of various light signals and use of signal flares.

Serious attention is being given to the battalion echelon which, with the help of skilled interpreters, provides communications with adjacent, supporting and logistical subunits. One of the NATO command's requirements for communications is an obligatory consideration for differences in military equipment used for this purpose. For example, U.S. Army enciphered communications cannot be used by the units and combined units of other countries, while some apparatus for enciphering wire communications available in West European armies is incompatible with American gear. NATO has established uniform terminology (connected especially with the conduct of artillery fire and with transmission of data on the enemy) and has elaborated instructions translated into all languages of bloc member countries and serving as the basis for properly maintaining liaison during combat actions, primarily at the "brigade-battalion" level.

The exchange of intelligence also is given an important place. Foreign military specialists believe that the accumulation of information on the enemy within the framework of the bloc depends largely on its being at the disposal of national command elements. It is planned to set up special intelligence processing groups at control points of the joint command elements. Each commander bears personal responsibility for organizing the collection of necessary information on the enemy within his zone of responsibility and for making it known to the joint command.

Bloc military specialists believe that introduction of a standard format for planning combat operations in NATO substantially facilitated the control of coalition forces. But there still are differences in the understanding of tactical issues, in the graphic presentation of the concept, in certain special terms and so on. It is planned to eliminate these deficiencies through personal contact of commanders and use of interpreters and liaison groups.

Commanders at all levels are acquiring skills in command and control when conducting combat actions as part of the coalition during joint operational and combat training activities. For example in the annual "Autumn Forge" maneuvers the NATO command element performs an immediate check of the effectiveness of the system for controlling joint armed forces it has created. The basis of this system are regulations, manuals and so-called standing instructions which regulate the procedure for combat employment of combined units and formations in a battle or operation. The latter are an appendix to the uniform regulations developed at the present time for actions by ground forces and tactical aviation. For example, the NATO ground forces regulation is supplemented by more than 30 such instructions: operation orders with appendices, orders on logistics and MTO [defense against underwater ordnance], reports on results of air strikes and artillery and mortar bombardment, situation reports, intelligence reports, forms for planning air movements, and so on. Each NATO joint tactical air command has dozens of its own standing instructions.

Foreign military specialists believe that the introduction of uniform personnel training programs, methodologies for holding exercises and practices, and common criteria for evaluating the results of combat training also help in successful resolution of the problem of controlling coalition forces. These documents are drawn up by staffs of army groups and OTAK [joint tactical air commands], coordinated with national command elements and approved by commanders in chief of NATO joint armed forces in theaters of military operations.

As the foreign press has reported, a certain amount of experience has been gained at the present time by the bloc supreme command and the staffs in controlling coalition armed forces during major exercises involving troops of different nations. The standardization being carried out within the bloc also helped this to no small degree. In particular, in evaluating joint operations of the Bundeswehr and other NATO troops during Exercise "Autumn Forge-78," FRG Minister of Defense H. Apel remarked that overall coordination had been arranged in bloc armed forces as a whole, but that there remain problems involving language barriers and the organization of control at the tactical level. They have to be resolved through a further deepening of standardization in documenting information.

A special role is given to the NATO Military Committee in this process, inasmuch as it bears responsibility as the bloc's supreme military entity for elaborating common strategy and tactics of the troops and for adopting

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common regulations, manuals and other documents. The Committee also conducts centralized planning of operational and combat training at the NATO level and monitors the fulfillment of agreements in the field of standardization.

The military-political leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance thus is seeking to achieve complete subordination of national armed forces to its own interests. In addition to carrying on extensive ideological conditioning of personnel in the anti-Soviet and anticommunist spirit, it is attempting to set up a finely tuned military mechanism for implementing the aggressive plans of imperialism.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON NATO 'REFORGER' EXERCISE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 19-24

[Article by Maj G. Vasil'yev: "Exercise 'Reforger' 10." Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Text] Thanks to the peaceloving efforts of the CPSU and Soviet government, firm foundations have been laid down in recent years in the relaxation of international tensions and the achievement of a mutual understanding among nations. But reactionary circles of imperialist states are attempting to return mankind to the "cold war" times and provoke armed conflicts by placing special hopes on the aggressive NATO military bloc. An important role is given to militaristic demonstrations in this regard, which are being incessantly conducted near the borders of socialist countries.

Troop and command and staff exercises are one of the primary forms for preparing NATO's joint armed forces for war. The primary goal of these exercises is to work out different variants in unleashing armed conflicts against countries of the Warsaw Pact and training staffs and troops to conduct combat operations under conditions which approximate to the maximum those of a realistic wartime situation.

Maneuvers held regularly by American troops with the participation of combined units and units of other bloc armies under the codename "Reforger" are devoted to accomplishing just such missions. The idea for the "Reforger" (abbreviated from the English words "Return of Forces to Germany") exercises arose in 1967 in connection with the return of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and 3d Separate Armored Cavalry Regiment from the FRG to the United States together with combat support and combat service support subunits (a total of 35,000 persons). The troops who were moved and the combat equipment stockpiled for them on West German territory remained part of the NATO joint armed forces according to their operational mission. The "dual basing" concept was tested in practice for the first time in 1969, when 12,000 service personnel were moved from the American continent to Europe for the period of the exercise.

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The latest exercise, "Reforger" 10, took place in August-October 1978 in the European Theater of War. It was a component of the NATO joint armed forces fall maneuvers under the codename "Autumn Forge-78."

As the foreign press noted, the exercise's military goals reduced primarily to testing the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to move troops of the strategic reserve from the American continent to Europe for reinforcement of the existing grouping of joint armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance and for practicing operational deployment and the conduct of combat operations in the initial period of a war.

Political goals also were pursued: to demonstrate the U.S. government's capability and resolve to give the necessary assistance to its NATO satellites in conformity with obligations it had assumed; to emphasize the bloc's unity; and to urge its allies toward a further buili-up in military preparations under cover of the myth of the "threat from the East." The exercise plan, under which military operations were begun, as always, by the "Orange," also was drawn up in a tendentious manner with consideration of this.

According to the leaders' plan, the beginning of the exercise was preceded by "complication" of the international situation in Europe, which then developed into an armed conflict between NATO countries ("Blue") and the Warsaw Pact ("Orange").

While the military-political situation is growing complicated, the "Blue" command element is taking steps to convert troops from a peacetime to a war footing and for their secret mobilization. It is moving screening units and subunits to the border area and the main body to a forward defensive line. There is a simultaneous build-up in the grouping of ground forces and air forces in Europe through the move of "dual-based" combined units and units from U.S. territory.

Under the guise of exercises, the "Orange" troops concentrate in the western border areas of the GDR and CSSR. Taking advantage of a superiority in personnel and weapons, they suddenly "violate" the FRG's state border and swiftly develop an attack into the depths in order to defeat groupings of NATO joint armed forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. After overcoming the zone of covering forces, their troops battle to take the forward defensive line. In the situation at hand the "Blue" forces halt further "enemy" advances at the cost of considerable losses, deliver a number of counterblows with second echelons (reserves) and assume a general counteroffensive.

As with similar maneuvers of past years, Exercise "Reforger" 10 was conducted in three phases which were associated by a single concept and by the missions being accomplished. General Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR, was in charge of the exercise. Control over the air movement of troops and cargoes was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Military Airlift Command of the Air Force, and control of movements by sea was assigned to the Military Sealift Command.

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During/Phase One/(15 August-17 September) there was a move of personnel from the United States to Europe by the combination method, arriving troops received combat equipment and heavy weapons from American depots in the FRG and subsequently moved up to operating areas. A total of around 13,000 service personnel and over 37,000 tons of cargo were delivered.

According to foreign press reports, forward support groups intended for receiving, servicing and accompanying the arriving units and subunits were moved by air initially (15-31 August) to West European airfields. Subsequently (1-13 September) aircraft delivered the main contingent of service personnel with light weapons from the 9th Infantry, 1st, 4th, 5th Mechanized and 10lst Air Assault divisions and from combat support and combat service support subunits of the National Guard and Army Reserve.

C-141 and C-5A military transport aircraft were assigned the airlift missions and flew an overall total of around 140 sorties. As the foreign press noted, four heavy Boeing 747 aircraft of the civilian airline TWA were used for the first time to transport troops. They carried over 600 persons and around 70 tons of cargo.

Personnel were loaded at airfields located near permanent bases of the units and subunits used for the exercise. The military transport aircraft flew at an altitude of 9,000-10,000 m at an average speed of up to 800 km/hr over the so-called North Atlantic Route with an intermediate landing at Goose Bay Air Base (Canada) for refueling. Unloading (taking 20-40 minutes per aircraft) was accomplished at Ramstein and Rhein-Main air bases (FRG) and at Brussels (Belgium), Schiphol (the Netherlands) and Luxembourg air bases. After disembarking from the aircraft, the arriving service personnel were taken by motor transport to American depots in West Germany (in the vicinity of Germersheim, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Mannheim and Pirmasens) for demothballing, checking and preparing combat equipment for the upcoming ground phase of the exercise. The motorized infantry battalions required an average of 4 hours to receive their authorized combat vehicles. Combat readiness of the combat equipment stored at the depots comprised 90-95 percent.

The naval transports "Admiral Callahan" and "Comet" carried over 50 medium tanks, around 120 army helicopters, 30 APC's, 1,000 vehicles and trailers, and up to 300 containers of military cargoes for the exercise. Around 3 days were spent loading combat equipment and cargoes in the port of Beaumont (Texas) and 16 days for the crossing of the Atlantic (the route was over 9,000 km long). On the route across the Atlantic the American transports were protected by ships of NATO member countries. Problems of combating "enemy" submarines were practiced while escorting the sea convoy.

The transports were unloaded in the ports of Ghent (Belgium) and Rotterdam (the Netherlands), to which tank driver-mechanics, helicopter crews and vehicle drivers had proceeded ahead of time.

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Subsequently the tracked vehicles and heavy weapons were transloaded to railroad flatcars for shipment to West Germany. Wheeled combat equipment was sent to assembly points located in the immediate vicinity of the ports of debarkation to undergo maintenance, after which they proceeded under their own power in columns of 20--30 vehicles with 30--50 minute intervals between columns. Technical monitoring and servicing points were deployed along movement routes (every 30--40 km). The average movement speed of the vehicular columns was 40--50 km/hr.

In addition to this, in Phase One of the exercise the American command moved two squadrons of F-4 tactical fighters (48 aircraft) to the FRG from Seymour Johnson Air Base (North Carolina). Their flight was made without intermediate landings (with aerial refueling).

/Phase Two/ (18-28 September) played out an opposed forces troop exercise of the U.S. Army V Corps under the codename "Certain Shield" and a command and staff exercise by the U.S. Army VII Corps under the codename "Cardinal Sword." Their primary content was the practicing of the organization and conduct of defensive and offensive actions against superior "enemy" forces.

Exercise "Certain Shield" took place on 18-28 September on the territory of the West German State of Hesse.

Participating in it were ground forces including units and subunits of the 4th, 5th, 8th Mechanized and 3d Armored divisions, 1lth Separate Armored Cavalry Regiment, 229th Army Aviation Battalion, and two field artillery groups from the United States and the 34th Tank Brigade, 2d Infantry Division of the Bundeswehr; and air forces including units and subunits of the U.S. 3d and 17th air forces, the FRG Tactical Air Command, as well as aircraft of Great Britain and Canada. Other units moved from the United States performed firing at West German ranges.

A total of around 56,000 service personnel, 2,800 tracked vehicles, 6,400 wheeled vehicles, and up to 500 aircraft and helicopters took part. Overall direction of the exercise was assigned to Lt Gen S. Berry, commander of the V Corps. Units and subunits of the U.S. 3d Armored Division and the FRG's 34th Tank Brigade operated realistically on the "Orange" side and represented a tank army in the exercise, while the remaining troops operated on the "Blue" side (an army corps was deployed conditionally).

The exercise began early on the morning of 18 September with a violation of the conditional state border by the "Orange." By the end of 19 September they had succeeded in overcoming the delaying actions of screening troops in the security zone as a result of intensive fighting. Combat operations were characterized by variable success in the following 2 days.

In attempting to prevent further "enemy" advances, the "Blue" forces delivered a series of counterattacks with the simultaneous launching of strikes by tactical aircraft and fire support helicopters. The "Orange" troops halted the offensive without having broken the defenders' resistence.

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The "Blue" forces drew reserves up from the depth, regrouped, assumed the counteroffensive across the entire front after a powerful fire preparation, threw back the "Orange" troops and restored the initial position on the conditional border.

Exercise "Cardinal Sword" was held from 18 through 23 September on FRG territory (in the vicinity of Bischofsheim, Kronach, Kuenzelsau, and Aschaffenburg).

The following headquarters were brought in for the exercise: the VII Corps, 1st and 3d Mechanized divisions, 1st Armored Division, 2d Separate Armored Cavalry Regiment, two field artillery groups and an engineer brigade of the United States, and the 14th Tank Brigade, 12th Tank Division of the Bundeswehr were the ground forces; and units and subunits of the U.S. 3d and 17th air forces as well as subunits of the FRG, Great Britain and Canada represented the air forces.

Lt Gen J. Beckton, commander of VII Corps, exercised overall direction of the exercise.

A tank army (the troops were not actually represented) operated conditionally on the "Orange" side and the aforementioned participants on the "Blue" side in conformity with the exercise plan.

The play of combat actions began on the morning of 18 September. The "Orange" forces conducted powerful fire preparation at dawn, took advantage of the surprise factor, violated the conditional state border and assumed the offensive, concentrating main efforts in the penetration sector. Supported by artillery and aviation, the "Blue" forces conducted delaying actions to slow up the advance of attacking troops and give their main body favorable conditions for deployment and organized commitment.

Despite the stubborn resistance of screening forces, the "Orange" forces overcame the security zone in 2 days of combat operations and moved up to the forward defensive line. In the following days the "Orange" forces built up efforts and wedged into "enemy" defenses to a depth of 7-15 km in individual sectors. They made tactical airborne landings to develop the attack tempos.

In the situation at hand the "Blue" forces regrouped their troops, committed second echelons and assumed a general counteroffensive after delivering powerful bombing and strafing attacks.

As noted by the foreign press, significant attention was given in the ground phase of Exercise "Reforger" 10 to the following matters: employment of tactical airborne landings and fire support helicopters; practicing methods of combating tanks and other armored targets; performing aerial reconnaissance using radioelectronic capabilities; exploring methods for optimum use of means of transport to move troops and cargoes to areas of combat operations;

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perfecting means of combat support and combat service support to troops; and improving the system of control, communications and coordination of combined units and units of different nationality.

In particular, exercises were conducted in parallel with Exercise "Reforger" 10 to work out the coordination of NATO troop actions in operations of the initial period of a war. These exercises were "Saxon Drive" (19-29 September) by the Netherlands Army I Corps and "Display Determination-78" (15 September-13 October) by the NATO joint armed forces in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations with the participation of separate U.S. Army units and subunits.

In /Phase III/ (28 September-27 October), the combined units and units moved from the United States for Exercise "Reforger" 10 performed artillery and tank field firing at the Grafenwoehr Range and mothballed and turned over combat equipment and heavy weapons to American depots in West Germany.

The return of troops and military cargoes by air and sea to the American continent was accomplished in the same order as in the first phase of the exercise. Combat equipment was delivered to ports of embarkation from areas where the ground phase of the exercise had been held and personnel and light weapons were delivered to the airfields from the depot areas.

According to foreign press reports, 23 service personnel died and 198 were injured during the exercise (in 1977 there were 17 killed and 120 injured). The total cost of damage to roads and crops during the NATO fall maneuvers is set at \$19 million.

Western observers note that the objectives set by the American command for Exercise "Reforger" 10 were completely attained. A feature of the 1978 exercise is a noticeable expansion in the contingent of U.S. Army units and subunits used to practice combat training missions under conditions of the European Theater of War. It is emphasized in this regard that a significant portion of the troops moved to the FRG under the exercise plan do not come under the so-called "dual-based" combined units, the combat equipment of which is stored at American depots in West Germany in case of war.

According to a statement by official NATO representatives, the bloc's leaders plan to continue to hold "Reforger" type exercises. A new Exercise "Reforger," which the foreign press reports was held in the FRG in January-February 1979 for the first time since 1973, can serve as confirmation of this intent of the NATO strategists. Like the fall exercise, it had three phases: a move of personnel and combat equipment from the continental United States to Western Europe "to reinforce NATO in a critical situation," exercises by combined units and units of American troops and their allies, and the return movement. A total of over 65,000 officers and men of armed forces of the United States, FRG, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took part in this exercise.

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The large-scale exercises being held in Western Europe attest to the fact that militaristic circles of the North Atlantic Alliance are continuing intensive military preparations having a clearly aggressive character and aimed primarily against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. All this obligates Soviet military personnel to increase their combat readiness constantly and stand vigilantly on guard over the revolutionary achievements of the people.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. GROUND FORCES ORGANIZATION

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to press 6 Apr 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Col B. Yushakov: "A Build-Up in the U.S. Army's Power"]

[Text] In continuing to develop plans for new aggressive wars, U.S. militaristic circles are conducting extensive activities to raise the combat readiness of ground forces and outfit them with the latest systems of ordnance and combat equipment.

As the American press notes, the organizational development of the country's ground forces in 1979 is being planned along the following basic lines: an increase in the strength of the U.S. Army in Europe by mid-year of 8,200 persons, who will be used to bring up to strength the combat units and subunits of four divisions, three separate brigades and two separate armored cavalry regiments stationed in the FRG; an increase of three battalions in the composition of corps and division artillery; the move of weaponry from the United States to Europe for one more armored division (the movement will be accomplished by sea and is to be completed by the end of 1979, including the construction of new depots and mothballing of ordnance and equipment); and the delivery there of another 210,000 tons of ammunition, after which the total ammunition stockpiles in this war theater will comprise 700,000 tons, and by the beginning of 1983 they will practically double and reach 1.3 million tons.

In 1979 there will be an increase in the U.S. Army inventory in Europe of 719 tanks (this will lead to a 19 percent increase in their numbers in the European War Theater), 914 APC's and 316 Improved Hawk ZRK [surface-to-air missile system], which will increase their numbers by 19 and 16 percent respectively. In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces command intends to increase the combat readiness of the ground forces grouping in Europe by beefing up means of electronic warfare, communications, and chemical defense and by increasing the unit reserves.

A great deal of importance is attached to combined units and units of the strategic reserve stationed in the United States and intended for movement to $\frac{1}{2}$

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Europe. The U.S. Army command envisages deliveries of a significant amount of weapons and an increase of the strength of combat units and subunits of the 1st Mechanized Division, 4th Mechanized Division, 2d Armored Division, 5th Mechanized Division and 24th Infantry Division to 100 percent.

During the year the 24th Infantry Division will complete a conversion to the T/O&E of a mechanized division and it will be redesignated the 24th Mechanized Division. As units and subunits of the 2d Infantry Division are removed from South Korea, they will be converted to the T/O&E of a "heavy" division. In this regard it is planned to activate two new tank battalions, an army aviation (helicopter) battalion, and battalions of the Hawk ZRK and field artillery.

According to western press reports, the Pentagon's organizational activities conducted after the end of the Vietnamese War permitted a change of the ratio in the strength of the headquarters apparatus and support subunits and combat units in the ground forces in favor of the latter. It is planned to bring the personnel strength of combat subunits at the tactical level up to 63 percent in 1979 and to provide the troops as a whole with 81 percent of battle tanks, 87 percent of fire support helicopters and 92 percent of self-propelled artillery (with respect to authorized numbers).

The American command also is planning to cease production of M60 tanks and its modifications by 1980 and accelerate the production of the new XMI tanks. It is planned to supply the first 110 vehicles of this type to units and subunits as early as 1979. The U.S. Army command intends to ask Congress to agree to the production of at least 7,000 XMI tanks instead of the approved 3,312.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. AND NATO MILITARY BASE SYSTEM

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 79 signed to press 4 May 79 $\acute{p}p$ 3-10

[Article by Maj Gen R. Simonyan, doctor of military sciences, professor: "Imperialism's System of Military Bases"]

[Text] In recent years the most reactionary forces of imperialism, weapons makers, and militarists have joined in a broad campaign against detente and disarmament. With increasing regularity they attempt to suppress people's liberation movements by force and intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries. Carrying out the will of these reactionary circles, the Pentagon, followed by the leadership of the NATO bloc, often revises its military-political views, military strategies, and strategic conceptions. However, they have a common foundation: the aspiration to set up a system of support points in foreign territory which can be used to carry out the aggressive designs of imperialism on a global scale.

Historically the policy of locating military bases in foreign lands began in the days of colonialism. Its primary purpose was construction of military outposts. The colonizers relied on them to keep enslaved peoples in submission. Military bases became especially significant in the age of imperialism. The capitalist countries began using them in the struggle to divide up an already divided world, to put down people's actions toward national independence, and to guard the sea and air lines of communication between the mother countries and the colonies. After World War II the so-called "base strategy" of imperialism was further elaborated. The United States, which had assumed the role of a kind of guarantor of international capitalism, began setting up a global system of bases and deploying enormous amounts of men and equipment at them. In its striving for world domination the White House has given exceptionally great attention to this aspect of its foreign policy. According to the testimony of H. Kissinger, "We (that is, the United States author) even looked at military alliances chiefly from the point of view of the possibility of using them to get the air bases we needed."

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The military authorities frequently have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to all persons living or working at the military facility, regardless of citizenship.

The Pentagon has been modifying and improving its military bases throughout the entire postwar period, adapting them to the demands and potential of new weapons, above all nuclear missiles. In this connection they have built launch sites to launch guided missiles. In addition, nuclear ammunition storehouses have been built and the system of communications is constantly being developed and refined.

As the foreign press emphasizes, many air bases in foreign lands, for example in Spain or Micronesia, are designated not only for tactical, but also strategic aviation. The capacities of the airfields are such that the number of planes stationed at them can be increased sharply. During certain periods of the war in Vietnam, for example, the American command concentrated about half of its strategic aviation in Southeast Asia.

Foreign military specialists consider that the naval bases should maintain constant presence of American ships, aviation, and marine units in regions that are thousands of miles from the United States. In their opinion, the navy has a steadily increasing role to play in demonstrations of force and putting pressure on other countries. Another factor considered here is that, for reasons that are perfectly clear, it is becoming harder and harder for the imperialist powers to maintain large contingents of their own troops in foreign lands.

In this respect, Adm T. Moorer, former chairman of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a revealing admission. He said, "Although the United States is pursuing a global policy (and is bound by treaty obligations to 43 countries), current trends are such that we should expect even greater resistance to granting the right to foreign bases and flights over foreign territory. The time may soon come in many regions of the world when we will not be able to move our ground and air forces through the ports and airfields available to us as was done in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam. Therefore, the American Navy must be ready for periodic, unforeseen actions in various regions of the world in conflicts of varying scale." The fears of the imperialist circles are not unfounded. This has been confirmed once again by the events in Iran where the popular masses resolutely opposed the American presence in the country.

At the present time the United States has concentrated its greatest number of military bases in Western Europe, especially the central part. This region occupies the chief place in American imperialism's "base strategy" and is considered the main base of operations for preparing and conducting military actions against the socialist countries. At the present time the United States maintains about 200 large military sites with up to 225,000 servicemen in West Germany. Great Britain is also keeping its military bases in this region with the principal grouping of English ground forces, the 55,000-strong British Army of the Rhine, stationed

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at them. Roughly 7,000 nuclear warheads are stored at special storehouses in Western Europe under the control of the American command.

The military bases of the NATO countries form two large arcs in Northern and Southern Europe. The northern arc passes through Great Britain, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, while the southern arc goes through Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the Mediterranean islands.

There are more than 20 different American bases with 20,500 personnel in Great Britain. The most important one is the advance atomic missile submarine base at Holly Loch, to which the 14th U. S. Navy Atomic Missile Submarine Squadron is signed. The Pentagon also gives an important role to its air bases in this country. These bases are suitable for various classes of fighting planes including strategic bombers. Several headquarters of the American armed forces are in Great Britain: U. S. Navy in the European Zone (London), 3rd Air Army (Mildenhall), and 14th U. S. Navy Atomic Missile Submarine Squadron (Holly Loch). Near Moor on the east coast of Great Britain is a radar post which, together with the Clear post in Alaska and Thule in Greenland, is assigned to detect the launching of strategic missiles. According to official figures it cost the United States 120.4 million dollars to build it.

The American base at Keflavik in Iceland supports aviation of the U. S. Air Force and Navy and of NATO. Its strategic importance is a result of its location near important lines of communication between Europe and North America. The facilities at this important site enable it to take all types of strategic, tactical, and transport aircraft.

In Norway, the foreign press has reported, the airfields at Gardermoen, Bodö, and Bardofoss have been equipped with underground hangars and storehouses for basing units of the Unified NATO Air Forces. In addition, 15 very large civilian airfields have been redesigned according to the requirements of the bloc command. Along the Norwegian coast there are three naval bases, seven basing points, and numerous bays that can be used to disperse the bases of NATO ships. The Norwegian minister of defense R. Hansen recently told representatives of the press that the government intends to make a decision to stockpile military gear and equipment for subunits of the British and Canadian armed forces in Norwegian territory.

An extensive network of headquarters of the Unified Armed Forces of NATO, three large naval bases (Copenhagen, Frederikshavn, and Korsør), and four airfields, as well as other military sites are located in Denmark. Many of them were constructed according to the NATO infrastructure program. Since 1951, with the consent of Danish militaristic circles, Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, has been included in what is called the "security zone of the American continent" within the NATO system. It has been converted into a vast American military base of operations in the Arctic. They have built two air bases there, including Thule, the largest air base in these northern regions, as well as several naval basing points. In addition, radio

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engineering stations have been established there for early detection and navigation support for American atomic missile submarines.

An extensive system of imperialist strongpoints has been established in the southern part of the European continent. In Spain, especially, large American air bases have been built at Torrejon (near Madrid) and Zaragoza, as well as the important air and naval complex at Rota on the Atlantic coast. These sites have more than 9,000 personnel. The United States concluded the first agreement to build these bases with the Franco Government in 1953. The treaty was extended in 1970, and then a new one was concluded in 1975. Rota, as the base of the 16th Atomic Missile Submarine Squadron, which is equipped with Poseidon missiles, plays the key role in the U. S. system of military bases in Spain. The principal aviation element based at Rota is naval reconnaissance aviation. These planes carry on observation beyond the approaches to Gibraltar from the Atlantic and Mediterranean sides. The journal MILITARY REVIEW, giving an assessment of the strategic importance of this country to the United States, points out that "Spain not only occupies an advantageous position as the connecting link with the chief ports of the Mediterranean Sea, but also backs up the NATO defensive structure on its southern flank."

The foreign press observes that the Spanish people are increasingly calling for the elimination of the American military presence. It was under the influence of these actions that the Pentagon was forced to move the 16th Atomic Missile Submarine Squadron from the Rota naval base to Kings Bay in the state of Georgia. This transfer is to be carried out this year.

Italy is given an equally important place in the Pentagon's "base strategy." As a NATO member Italy has allowed the United States to locate the shore headquarters of the 6th Fleet in Naples. In the assessment of foreign experts, this fleet is the main force of the bloc's naval strike forces in the Southern European theater. It usually has two aircraft carriers (160-180 fighting aircraft on board), two or three missile cruisers, up to 20 destroyers and frigates, several atomic submarines, landing ships, auxiliary vessels, and shore-based patrol aircraft. In addition to building in Naples, the United States has built an airfield for base aviation at Sigonella on the island of Sicily and a large number of support points in more than 25 regions of Italy. These military sites have modern means of communication and various storage and other equipment. A broad network of airfields has also been established in İtaly according to the NATO program to base tactical aviation (Aviano, Catania, and others). According to reports in the foreign press the Americans, with important bases and support points for various purposes (naval, aviation, general, supply, communications, and so on) in the country, maintain more than 10,000 military servicemen in Italy.

Speaking of the significance of this militarily important region to the Pentagon, the Western press emphasizes: "The United States will be able to adjust, even if it is painful, to the loss of its other Mediterranean

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sites. However, without its present disposition of forces, it will not be able to operate effectively in this sea without its Italian bases."

Many American and NATO bases are concentrated in Greece. In establishing them NATO strategists figure that this country is located at the intersection of air and sea routes connecting Europe with the Middle East and Africa and borders on countries of the socialist community. There are foreign military airfields in Suda on the island of Crete and in continental Greece. The communications center of the Sixth Fleet is also located on the island of Crete. The United States has more than 3,000 military servicemen in Greece.

It is common knowledge that since August 1974 Greece has occupied a special place within NATO. It announced its withdrawal from the military organization of the bloc and a review of the status of the American troops located in Greek territory. Extremely upset by this development of events, the United States offered Greece almost 1 billion dollars to keep the previous status of American bases in the country. Judging from reports in the foreign press, in 1976 the Greek Government signed such a treaty, but did not make a final decision on this question. At the present time, foreign strategists are doing everything they can to force Athens to ratify a new treaty on bases and bring the country back into the NATO military organization. Their thinking is based on the idea that the military presence of American troops in Greece and Turkey "reliably secures the eastern flank of NATO." A weakening of this presence would curtail the Pentagon's access to support points in the Eastern Mediterranean and "undermine U. S. power not only in the military balance in Europe, but also in the balance of forces along the entire coast of the Middle East."

There are up to 40 American military sites in Turkey, including 26 bases with 4,800 personnel. The most important ones are Injirlik (Adana) and Izmir. Intelligence posts whose purpose is to obtain espionage information about "Soviet activities" are located near the cities of Sinop, Karamursel, Diyarbakir, and Bolbashi. It is known that in July 1975 the Turkish Government halted operations at American bases in its territory in response to an embargo on delivery of U. S. arms which was imposed by the Congress after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. At that time Ankara announced that it would monitor all American structures and that in the future they would be used exclusively in NATO's interest. However, on 4 October 1978 in response to lifting the embargo the Turkish Government adopted a decree on the provisional status of the American bases and renewal of their activities.

In connection with the events in Iran, pressure on Turkey from the NATO leaders intensified greatly. Representatives of the United States, West Germany, France, and Great Britain called an emergency meeting to work out a program of economic aid for Turkey as one of the "bulwarks" of the West in the Middle East. In the evaluation of foreign specialists, the forced withdrawal of the U. S. military machine from Iran increased the importance of similar militaristic sites in Turkey,

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bordering the Soviet Union. Negotiations are underway at the present time to establish the permanent status of American forces in Turkey.

According to a report by the NEW YORK TIMES, in January 1979 the Americans were already removing secret electronic equipment from Iran to Turkey.

The foreign press emphasizes that after the fall of the Shah's regime, a mountain of rubble was left from American interests in Iran. According to representatives of the new authorities in the country, Iran aspires to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union and refuses to serve as a base for aggression or hostile propaganda against the USSR.

Considering the ever-expanding struggle of people against the military presence of the United States in countries of this region, Pentagon specialists emphasize that "no reasonable U. S. strategists will be able to plan the future of the American military presence in the Mediterranean Sea on the foundation of existing base facilities; he will be compelled to give serious concern to backup variations." These variations are being developed. According to information in the foreign press, talks are now underway with the Government of Israel to turn over military bases on occupied Arab territories to the United States and to lease space in the port of Haifa for basing American ships. In addition, Egypt has agreed to offer bases.

The Far East and Southeastern Asia have long occupied an important place in imperialist policies. After the end of World War II the imperialist powers, above all the United States, created a far-flung system of military bases and support points there, a significant share of which are concentrated today in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and several other parts of the Pacific Ocean. There are about 200 military bases and support points in Japan today, several operated jointly with troops of the host country. More than 46,000 American servicemen are stationed at them. According to official figures, the Pentagon spent more than 4 billion dollars to build these bases. The largest naval bases are Yokosuka and Sasebo, which have become the principal forward bases of the U. S. 7th Fleet in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. In conformity with the American-Japanese "security pact" concluded in 1951 and extended indefinitely in 1970, all U. S. Navy fighting and auxiliary vessels may enter the ports of Japan freely.

The U. S. Air Force makes full or partial use of 15 air bases and airfields. The main ones are Yokota, Misawa, and Kadena (on Okinawa).

The United States has more than 40 large weapons and ammunition store-houses, an extensive network of communications equipment, a command and control system, and other facilities on the islands of Japan. Assessing the place of Japan in Washington's overall military plans, the foreign press emphasizes that no other country in Asia is so important for the United States in political, economic, and military strategic terms than this country, which has mighty industrial potential and great military capabilities.

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In recent years the American bases and support points in South Korea have become much more important. The Pentagon considers them the last U. S. base of operations in continental Asia, in addition to being in the immediate vicinity of North Korea and the Soviet Primor'ye. The United States has 41,600 armed forces personnel stationed in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. The most important base points are Seoul, where the headquarters of the 8th Army and 1st Unified American-South Korean Corps headquarters are located, and Inchon (Red Cloud Camp), which is the headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Division. Fighting units of the air force are based primarily at four air bases: Osan, Cunsan, Kwangju, and Taegu. As for the American Navy, it has a permanently functioning element in the headquarters of the U. S. Navy Command in South Korea, which insures appropriate readiness at points where American ships are based on the South Korean coast. U. S. navy fighting task forces and units are not permanently stationed or assigned to this region, although ships of the 7th Fleet, including aircraft carriers, often visit the ports in the southern part of the peninsula to perform so-called "Pacific missions."

The American press has written a great deal recently about the decision of the Pentagon and U. S. congress to withdraw American ground forces from this region. According to information in the foreign press, however, the total number of American forces in South Korea, far from decreasing, has actually increased by 1,500. Certain influential circles in Washington have set their objective as forcing the White House to renounce its earlier plans of reducing forces in this region.

The American armed forces have three very large bases in the Philippines: the Subic Bay naval base, Clark Field air base, and Kubi Point naval air base. In addition there are several small sites. The United States has about 14,000 servicemen in the Philippines. The government of that country has raised the question of reviewing the treaty on bases several times. Only in early 1979 after three years of American-Philippine talks was agreement reached to make several changes in the treaty envisioning, in particular, a slight decrease in the territory occupied by bases and an enhancement of Philippine jurisdiction over them. According to the agreement reached the Pentagon keeps the right to conduct any military operations from the sites it occupies.

American strategists have given concentrated attention to Micronesia in recent years. As the WASHINGTON POST testifies, the Pentagon is disturbed about the future of U. S. military bases in Japan and the Philippines. Therefore, it is considered essential to bolster the U. S. position in the Pacific Ocean by expanding existing military sites and establishing new ones in more "secure" regions. For example, the large Andersen military air base receives heavy B-52 bombers while atomic submarines carrying Polaris and Poseidon missiles visit the naval base. There are various military complexes on the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Majuro also. The military strategic system of support points in Micronesia, Pentagon strategists believe, will help establish U. S. control in this part of the Pacific Ocean. It is no accident,

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therefore, that to preserve its military bases in this region in the United States is conducting negotiations to annex it as supposedly "freely associated territory," and is trying to use "referenda," such as the one planned for the Marshall Islands, for this purpose.

That is the picture of the U. S. military presence in the Pacific Ocean today where, according to foreign press reports, the Pentagon maintains upwards of 130,000 servicemen in different branches of the armed forces.

A similar picture is observed in the Indian Ocean region. According to a 1955 agreement ships of the British Navy and of its allies may be based at Simonstown, the principal naval base of the South African Republic. With initiation of operations at the large military sites on the island of Diego Garcia the imperialist forces hope to combine all the support points created in Western Europe and the Middle East with the far-flung system of bases in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Speaking of the significance of Diego Garcia in the system of the Pentagon's overseas bases, former Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Zumwalt observed that this complex "gives the United States the possibility of deploying armed forces in the Indian Ocean region and thus supporting the conduct of American foreign policy there."

At the present time the United States is nurturing plans to establish a new 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean to assure a "permanent presence" there. The Indian newspaper PATRIOT writes that, together with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in the Pacific, it would form a continuous military-strategic semicircle enveloping the entire Asian continent.

The United States has built a far-flung system of military bases in Latin America, particularly Puerto Rico and the Bahamas, under the slogan of "joint defense." The Panama Canal Zone has been transformed into a major stronghold. In addition to military fortification, training points have been established there for specialists in the struggle against the revolutionary movement in Latin America and on the other continents.

"Dual-base" formations have been established to quickly reinforce American armed forces at overseas bases. The personnel of these formations have light weaponry and are stationed in the continental United States, while their equipment is located in storehouses in strategically important regions of Europe. When a situation becomes critical the personnel of these formations can be moved quickly to the appropriate region.

MILITARY REVIEW has emphasized that in deciding the question of "advance deployment" of the armed forces of the United States in the 1970's and 1980's and the specific location of military bases it will be necessary to study carefully all factors in order to avoid a situation where political considerations may hinder the use of military advantages offered by this method of relocating troops. Formations and units, the journal continued, should, as much as possible, be stationed in territory under the control of the United States or its allies.

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However, even in countries which are allies of the United States there are increasing demands to put an end to American military-political pressure or at least reduce it. In this setting the policies of the Beijing leaders, who are calling for an increase in the U. S. "military presence" in all regions of the world, looks very unseemly.

The positive changes that have occurred in the international arena increasingly reveal the flawed character of the imperialist strategy which envisions military bases of the United States and the other NATO countries in foreign territories serving the goals of the aggressive policies of imperialism and threatening international security.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. AND NATO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 79 signed to press 4 May 79 pp 29-35

[Article based on foreign press materials by Maj Gen V. Gidaspov "Views on Waging Offensive Operations"]

[Text] The military leadership of the United States and NATO, continuing to enlarge military preparations for carrying out their aggressive intentions and working out new notions concerning the use of armed forces in different types of battle, are devoting considerable attention to furthering the effectiveness of the use of field forces, formations, and units of ground forces in modern warfare.

As the foreign press testifies, the ground forces of the NATO countries are capable of waging combat actions in different theaters either independently or in cooperation with the navy and air force and with or without the use of nuclear weapons. It is observed that the offensive is one of the primary forms of operation accomplished by the ground forces. Its essential features are reliable suppression of the enemy with all types of weapons and a swift advance by formations and units to the depth of the enemy disposition to wipe out or seize manpower, weapons, and military equipment and to take vitally important regions (sites).

In the opinion of the U.S. and NATO commands, the success of the offensive depends on a number of factors which determine the increase in the fighting might of ground forces under contemporary conditions.

The corresponding American regulations and manuals emphasize that at the present time the capabilities of ground forces in waging offensive operations have increased greatly. The main explanation for this is that it has become possible to carry out rapid movements of formations and units with regular weapons and equipment to various theaters or to remote regions of the same theater (strategic mobility) and to use contemporary combat equipment to wage aggressive offensive actions right on the field of battle (tactical mobility).

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The armored troops are the main striking force of the ground forces of the principal NATO countries. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the combination of high mobility and fire power enable tank formations to deliver swift strikes against the enemy, break up and wipe out groupings of enemy forces, and concentrate efforts quickly in the decisive axes (see Figure 1 [not reproduced]). It is observed that modern tanks have enormous fire power. A World War II tank needed 13 shells for a 50 percent probability of hitting a stationary target; a modern tank needs one. The armor protection has almost doubled even as a general trend occurs toward reduced dimensions by improvements in the technology of producing engines, tracks, and suspension systems. The power rating of engines has also roughly doubled, while the energy availability has increased by 25 percent, specific pressure on the earth has been reduced, and range has tripled. In addition, tanks are equipped with night vision instruments which increase the effectiveness of combat actions at any time of the day or night. The effectiveness of fire on the move has been sharply improved by installing stabilization systems on the tanks.

However, according to the views of foreign military specialists, tanks cannot operate independently in current conditions. They need support from motorized infantry, field artillery, air defense forces and means, tactical and army aviation, and engineer troops. Maximum effectiveness in the use of armored formations and units in offensive operations is achieved in cooperation with them.

In an offensive infantry and motorized infantry perform the missions of wiping out or neutralizing enemy personnel, seizing and holding the most important terrain sectors or sites, and fighting airborne landings and sabotage-reconnaissance groups. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the infantry now has the necessary firepower and combat equipment to accomplish these missions successfully in an offensive operation.

The contemporary ground forces of the principal NATO countries have considerable artillery fire power, and views concerning its use have changed significantly in recent times. It is observed that the regular and attached artillery of armored and mechanized divisions of the ground forces has become almost completely self-propelled. As a result, it is possible for the commander to use it in general battle formations with striking (tank) subunits during the offensive and to maneuver rapidly with fire along the front to concentrate efforts in the main axis.

Field artillery, moving with the advancing units of tanks and motorized infantry or directly behind them, can concentrate fire at the necessary time and place to wipe out enemy infantry and motorized infantry, artillery and mortars, and air defense forces and means. In addition, less time is required to prepare firing data for unforeseen targets and control of fire has been made simpler by equipping field artillery battalions and batteries with special automated systems, in particular the Tacfire system (United States). The use of laser rangefinders has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the first salvo.

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The range of fire of all artillery systems has increased greatly. For example, close support artillery has increased its range from 10-11 kilometers to 18-20, and general support artillery has gone from 14-15 to 30-32 kilometers. The area hit by a salvo by one battery has also gone from 1,500 square meters during World War II to 25,000 square meters at the present time. The ability of artillery to hit point targets has increased sharply with the adoption of shells that are guided in the final leg of the trajectory. As foreign specialists observe, the fire power of close fire support artillery has increased an average of 50 percent compared to World War II artillery and its range has increased 60 percent.

Army aviation as a fundamentally new arm of troops has considerably broadened the sphere of application of ground forces. The ability of helicopters to hit virtually any target on the field of battle (see Figure 2 [not reproduced]) combined with the ability to land large tactical parties greatly increases the pace of the advance, according to foreign military experts. The use of helicopters for aerial reconnaissance enables commanders of the tactical element to observe the terrain and enemy action continuously, which helps them size up a situation quickly and adopt appropriate plans.

It is especially emphasized that modern helicopters equipped with powerful aviation cannons and missiles are highly effective in destroying enemy manpower and combat equipment, chiefly tanks and other armored vehicles. Antitank helicopter units and subunits are being formed in many NATO countries for more effective use of helicopters on the field of battle.

It is observed that the use of helicopters in the interests of infantry formations and units increases troop mobility and significantly reduces their vulnerability on the field of battle. It also enables them to operate in regions that are inaccessible to tanks and armored vehicles (swamps, mountains, jungles, and large populated points). Infantry subunits that are transportable by air can provide a greater degree of surprise than tank and mechanized units. The broad introduction of army aviation helicopters in the regular organizational structure of the subunits and units of the ground forces has given them completely new combat characteristics which infantry has never before had.

The use of helicopters has also changed the system of logistical troop support abruptly. It has become virtually independent of the condition of roads, passability of the terrain, and degree of preparation of sites for receiving various types of supplies.

The capabilities of tactical aviation as a means of support for ground forces have expanded considerably. It is emphasized that contemporary fighter planes provide a high probability of hitting targets. In addition, their combat load, radius of action, and, related to this, length of time the plane is over the field of battle, have also increased. The effectiveness of actions by subunits and units of tactical aviation in the accomplishment of various combat missions has risen sharply with the appearance of automated control systems.

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The combat capabilities of troop air defense means have increased. The Western press reports that current antiaircraft artillery systems have high rates of fire and are equipped with automatic or semiautomatic devices that insure reliability and speed in all processes involved in their use in combat. Antiaircraft guided missiles, which the armies of all the world's major countries have now adopted, are considered to be a highly effective means of fighting an aerial enemy.

The number of air defense weapons in combined arms formations has increased concurrently with improvement in their quality. Current divisions have almost twice as many air defense weapons as the divisions of the late 1940's (some divisions today have 100-110 weapons units). Air defense subunits have become an inalienable part of the organizational structure of any combined arms formation.

The combat capabilities of formations, units, and subunits in action at night have grown. The adoption of small night-vision instruments and equipping not just tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopters, but also artillery, mortar, guided missile, and other combat teams, with them enables the commander waging battle in limited visibility or at night to accomplish combat missions with the same men and equipment that he would use in daylight.

The combat might of formations and units of the ground forces is also increasing through the adoption of radioelectronic forces and means, called "radioelectronic warfare" in NATO terminology. One of the American regulations says bluntly that any commander may suffer defeat regardless of the number of troops if enemy radioelectronic means prevent him from controlling subordinate troops, issuing instructions for fire support, logistic support, and so on. It is also thought that these devices can have a major effect on electronic weapons control systems. In general, as the regulations and manuals of foreign armies emphasize, correct use of available radioelectronic forces and means enables the enemy to suppress the control and cooperation radio network, disrupt control of movements of reserves, and reduce the effectiveness of fire.

in the assessment of foreign military specialists, these are the factors that have brought about the current increase in the combat might of the ground forces. Now let us review some questions of their waging offensive actions.

According to U.S. Army regulations, the principal mission of ground forces is to wage combat actions against the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. It is observed that to achieve the goals of an offensive operation forces and firepower appropriate to the situation must be concentrated in the decisive sector and then combat actions waged by the combined efforts of all arms of troops in order to insure maximum use of friendly weapons and reduce the effectiveness of enemy use of weapons.

To create superiority over the enemy it is recommended that primary attention be devoted to the surprise factor, making maximum use of the mobility of friendly troops and broad deception (simulation of radio

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communications, radio silence, disorienting radar, "psychological warfare" operations, concealed movements, and the like). The effect of surprise is greatly enhanced with an attack at night.

It is recommended that the commander use all types of reconnaissance to study the enemy, including commander's reconnaissance of the terrain and reconnaissance by fighting to determine the grouping and location of enemy forces and firepower and identify the regions of weakest or weakened defense and concealed approaches to the area where the weakest grouping is. The commander is personally responsible for timely organization of the gathering of reconnaissance information about the enemy and for the use of all regular and attached reconnaissance forces and

The decisive condition for smashing the enemy is considered to be concentrating the main forces in a narrow sector of the front where the defense is most weakly organized. This requires concealed regrouping of forces, which is achieved by the high mobility of armored, mechanized, airmobile, and airborne troops and by flexibility in the use of artillery and army and tactical aviation.

During the period of regrouping and concentration of friendly forces in the axis of the main strike the commander must organize neutralization of enemy weapons in the zone of the upcoming offensive, enlisting regulation and attached forces and means for this purpose. In this primary attention is given to neutralization of reserves which may be used for counterstrikes and air defense weapons, because carrying out these and other steps insures successful fulfillment of the missions of the offensive.

The regulations and manuals of the NATO armies generally consider two types of offensive action, the offensive prepared ahead of time and the offensive on the run. The commander chooses one or the other depending on the concrete combat situation.

The offensive prepared in advance is usually carried out where there is direct contact with the enemy and the commander has adequate information on the enemy's men and equipment, system of defense, intentions, and possible nature of actions. It begins after lengthy, careful planning with a powerful artillery and air strike to the full depth of the enemy defense. This may last 1-2 hours. Then comes a swift assault by tanks and mechanized units and subunits in the breakthrough sectors.

The primary goal of the first strike is to rapidly overcome the cover zone and break through the primary line of defense in the sector or sectors of the offensive, inflict maximum damage on the units of the enemy's first echelon, disrupt control of enemy forces, and create conditions for development of the offensive in the operational depth. After a successful breakthrough, fresh forces from the second echelons or reserves should be committed to the fighting and move swiftly to the depth of the enemy defense, seize important terrain sectors, sites, and communications centers, cut off paths of retreat, wipe out reserves without stopping to fight encircled or blockaded groups of enemy

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troops and, developing the success, force the enemy to stop organized resistance and begin retreating.

This is followed by the stage of pursuit of a withdrawing enemy, which involves chiefly actions to break up the remaining group and encircle it in order to wipe it out with all available fire forces and means. The pursuit should be carefully planned and precisely organized so that the enemy feels constant pressure along the entire front of the offensive at all times of the day or night.

The offensive on the run is organized against an enemy who has successfully occupied a defense, when friendly forces perform a maneuver to close with him. This type of offensive is recommended in the case where the opposing side has not had time to organize command and control of men and equipment, prepare defensive lines, arrange fire cooperation, and bring up fresh forces from the reserve or second echelons.

The chief objective of the offensive on the run is to inflict maximum damage on the enemy to prevent him from withdrawing and force him to begin combat actions under unfavorable conditions. For a successful offensive on the run it is considered essential that cover forces which begin the fighting be strong and mobile, including subunits of all arms of troops, and that they be prepared to perform combat missions away from the main forces. After beginning fighting they pin down enemy first-echelon forces and support immediate commitment of the main forces of the offensive grouping to the battle. Special attention is directed to the need to maintain a high rate of advance by searching for weak spots in the enemy defense, open unit boundaries and flanks. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, losing speed in the advance threatens the entire operation and usually forces troops to switch to an offensive prepared in advance. In modern highly mobile combat action the offensive directly on the run is considered most likely.

The regulations and manuals of the ground forces of the principal capitalist countries devote considerable attention to logistic support of troops in the offensive. It is emphasized that the success of any operation depends significantly, if not decisively, on how well the commander is able to provide his subordinate units and subunits with all necessary supplies to wage combat actions. With this in mind it is considered imperative that the system of deployment of rear units and institutions correspond to the missions of the attacking troops.

Depending on the situation rear support is organized as close as possible to troop battle formations so that combat equipment may be serviced and restored as quickly as possible. One of the chief requirements of the system of rear support is continuity of logistic supply in all stages of preparation and conduct of an offensive operation. During combat actions rear units and subunits must satisfy all needs of combat subunits, especially those in the first echelon.

To do this, centers for special technical servicing of combat vehicles and weapons, wheeled transport, army aviation planes and helicopters,

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ammunition, communications and radioelectronic equipment, and ground apparatus are usually established in the corps rear regions. These centers deliver spare parts, individual aggregate units, and entire systems and also send teams of repair experts to the regions of most intensive fighting where they cooperate with the appropriate subdivisions of division repair battalions.

Such are the views of the U.S. and NATO commands on waging offensive actions by ground forces without the use of nuclear weapons. The regulations and manuals of the NATO countries demand that personnel be ready to wage combat actions with decisive objectives, for only an attack can rout and destroy enemy forces and then seize his territory. The principles of the regulations and manuals are constantly tested during numerous troop and command-staff exercises of the national and NATO Unified Armed Forces (see colored insert [not reproduced]).

During consideration of the principles of waging offensive actions using conventional weapons, one notes those "characteristics" which may also be typical for combat where nuclear weapons are used. It is not concealed here that "under certain conditions" the NATO command may decide to use them first. It is no accident that, in connection with the sharp increase in the fighting potential of the formations and units of ground forces achieved by adoption of more up-to-date and effective types of weapons and combat equipment and improvements in organizational structure, the armies of the NATO countries have recently increased the nuclear potential of both ground forces and air and naval forces further. Our answer to all the machinations of our enemies will be high vigilance and combat readiness to defend the gains of socialism against infringement by any aggressor.

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